The greatest lesson of the still young 21st century is proving to be that governments are the primary source of systemic risk to the economy, our standard of living, and our liberty.

The latest case in point is the European government debt crisis, with Greece once again running out of money and threatening to trigger yet another financial crisis. The government’s debt now totals more than 150% of its GDP, and continues to grow. Last year’s bailout by other European governments was supposed to give it the time needed to reduce its budget deficits so that next year Greece could roll over its maturing debts, as well as finance additional deficits at interest rates under 6%. However, the government’s austerity plan of tax increases and budget cuts has not reduced current or projected government deficits because the economy in 2010 contracted by 4.5% and the unemployment rate jumped to 15%.

The combination of a contracting economy and rising debt levels has driven the market yield on Greek two-year notes to near 25% and on its 10-year debt to around 15%. Since these loans are in euros, rates this high reflect the growing risk the people of Greece will not be able to make good on their collective debts. They also effectively shut the government out of the capital markets. Last week, S&P downgraded its rating on Greek debt to B from BB-, well into junk bond territory.

The downgrade reflects the increasing possibility that Greece will restructure its debt by forcing current debt holders to accept longer maturities, or do what demonstrators in the streets of Athens are demanding, which is to force its creditors to take a loss on their loans.

Normally, this would be a matter between a debtor and its creditors. However, European Central Bank (ECB) Executive Board Member Juergen Stark warns that the effects of restructuring “could overshadow the effects of the Lehman bankruptcy,” which is associated with the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis.

At the heart of that financial crisis were government policies including Federal Reserve efforts to manipulate the economy by keeping interest rates artificially low and a weak dollar policy that fueled the housing bubble, federal government rules and regulations that de facto required banks to make loans to high risk borrowers, and two government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who stood ready to purchase hundreds of billions of dollars of sub-prime mortgages if only Wall Street could figure out how to turn them into high grade bonds.

In the case of Greece, government actions and regulations also lie at the heart of what threatens to be a European financial crisis.

Greek social security funds hold nearly two-thirds of their liquid assets in government bonds. Thus, any default would undermine these funds’ ability to meet their obligations to pay promised health and pension benefits. Such an outcome understandably would create massive political unrest that could reduce government revenues and the government’s ability to make good on its debts.

This risk is amplified by special rules created by politicians that encourage banks to lend freely to governments.

Here’s how it works. Governments require banks to hold capital against the loans that they make, anticipating that in the normal course of business, some of the loans will not be repaid. The riskier the loan, the more capital that needs to be held in reserve.

However, under international rules negotiated by government representatives through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), government loans fit into a special category that has a 0% risk requirement. That means European banks do not have to hold any reserves against loans they make to European governments. That’s right, politicians implicitly promised banks that governments would never default. And, given the opportunity to make “risk free” loans that require no capital commitment, bankers purchased mountains of government debt.

According to Reuters, Greek banks own nearly 60 billion euros ($ 84 billion) of Greek government debt, and would almost certainly need additional capital and potentially a government bailout in the event of a government default.

In addition, the European Central Bank has increased the risk of systemic failure by becoming one of Greece’s largest creditors. As reported by The New York Times, J. P. Morgan estimates that the ECB owns 40 billion euros of Greek debt. In addition, it has lent 91 billion euros to Greek banks, with much of that backed by Greek government bonds.

That means any Greek default would cost the ECB billions of euros in losses and potentially impact the value of the euro, disrupting European and international financial markets, and the conduct of European monetary policy.

In a television interview last Friday, ECB Vice President Lucas Papademos warned: “…the adverse consequences both on the banking system in Greece as well as on financial stability in the euro area as a whole can be far reaching and undesirable. So all in all, I think that Greek debt restructuring should not be on the agenda.”

One possible “far reaching and undesirable” consequence of such a disruption to European financial markets would be follow-on defaults by Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. According to AEI Scholar Desmond Lachman, the combined debt of the first four countries alone is about $ 2 trillion, a large portion of which is held by European banks. As a consequence, a write-down of 30% of that debt could lead to a European financial crisis not unlike that which struck the US banks from subprime mortgages.

Thus, the systemic risk created by the political class has put the citizens of Europe on the hook for irresponsible levels of government spending. Wealth producers are faced with the lose-lose choices of bailing out governments, bailing out bankers who were induced into buying government debt, or suffering the economic consequences and losses associated with widespread bank failures.

The brewing European debt crisis demonstrates again that the greatest source of systemic risk is believing politicians when they promise government guarantees are costless, and that elite public servants are capable of protecting us from systemic risks in the first place. The lesson is that giving governments more power over the economy and financial system is itself a source of potentially catastrophic financial and economic instability.

Regards,

Charles Kadlec,

The franc’s perceived stability amid growing eurozone troubles has strengthened it considerably in comparison to the euro and Central European currencies. This is not only worrisome to the consumers in the countries with significant franc-denominated debt, who now struggle to service their increasing debt load, but also for financial institutions that hold significant assets in Central Europe, such as that of Austria.

While new homeowners in Poland and Hungary have shied away from franc-denominated loans since the franc’s strengthening in the wake of the beginnings of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis in early 2010, the franc has traditionally been considered a stable currency with low associated interest rates and therefore a good alternative to the euro. The majority of Polish and Hungarian mortgage purchasers before 2008 took out their loans in francs at a time when, due to the economic dynamism of the emerging Polish and Hungarian economies, the zloty and forint were relatively strong in relation to the Swiss franc. The franc traded for 160 forints before the crisis; it currently trades for 224, a 40 percent increase. Similarly, the franc traded for 2.1 zlotys in July 2008 before jumping 57 percent to currently trade at 3.3. Moreover, the fluctuation in the zloty or forint value of the Swiss-denominated loan proportionally increases the debt repayment value. The compulsory nature of making a mortgage payment (the failure to pay one’s mortgage will eventually result in losing one’s home) means that debtors are unlikely to default despite the increase in monthly mortgage payment value. However, debtors are also likely to drastically cut all other spending when faced with the risk of default, thus undercutting domestic consumption — a major driver of the Polish economy in particular.

The situation is not necessarily as alarming as some reports from Poland and Hungary claim. Central European governments have begun implementing stabilization measures to reduce the risk to mortgage owners. The Hungarian parliament approved a legislative package June 10 that included fixing the exchange rate on franc-denominated mortgage repayments at 180 forints. Hungary is also considering implementing a program that would buy back a defaulting property and take in its owners as tenants. Poland has thus far taken a passive role on the issue but has declared itself willing to intervene should mortgage defaults become imminent. Moreover, Switzerland itself has an incentive to devalue its currency, mainly to ensure that its large export sector remains competitive. To a certain extent, the Swiss government can mitigate the rise of the franc by purchasing foreign currency, particularly euros, driving down the demand for francs. The problem is that Switzerland has already been undertaking such an effort since the start of the eurozone crisis and yet the franc has still appreciated considerably.

However, a major economic event in the eurozone — such as a Greek default, Spanish banking problems, or the brewing political crises in Italy and Spain — could cause the franc to skyrocket in relation to both the euro and currencies such as the zloty and the forint. Such an increase could be so large that even the Hungarian and Polish governments would be unable to avoid massive domestic defaults on mortgages and Switzerland would be powerless to offset its strengthening currency. Homeowners with mortgages denominated in Swiss francs would find themselves unable to repay the value of the appreciated loan in their domestic currency and would be forced to defau

This certainly would not bode well for Europe, especially Austria. The 2008 financial crisis started in Europe when the collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a massive capital flight away from Central Europe, and a mortgage crisis in Hungary or Poland could potentially replicate these triggers, leading to contagion across the Continent. Austria, could act as the gateway for the crisis into the eurozone. The Austrian financial sector would have to incur these losses, potentially forcing Vienna to bail out its banks, focusing the markets and investors on Austria itself.

Just in case someone was confused about the relationship between liquidity, currency devaluation and nominal (not real) asset prices, the St. Louis Fed was kind enough to email us their weekly M2 level. And after last week’s surprising drop, M2 once again rose, this time by a whopping $ 40 billion. Oh and before someone says that M3 is still declining, it isn’t. Or rather the much more important monetary aggregate, that including all shadow banking liabilities is now increasing as we indicated during the last Z.1 spread. In one month, when the next Flow of Funds report is released we are confident we will confirm that in Q4 shadow banking increased by at least half a few hundred billion on an annualized basis. In other words the central bank reliquification is now on in full force, both in America and in every other place that has central banks. Which also explains why central banking hawks are now virtually extinct (cf: Axel Weber).

When we reported on last week’s net spec contract position per the CFTC, we noted that speculators are expecting a roughly 50% hike in the price of rice based on comparable historical patterns. Updating for this week’s data confirms that the upside price bets, which increased from 6,652 to 7,114 have just surged above the previous top hit in late 2009, of 6,773. Yet they are still just shy of the all time highs from February 2008 when they stood at 7,883. As the spec activity in rice predates major price moves rather efficiently, the continued bets on a price surge mean something is bound to snap. And with rice prices continuing to be rather sticky, considering the move in all other grains, we may be in for a very major break out in the coming week. Or not: as we have now learned the hard way, the banking cartel has way to keep commodity prices low, until explosive break outs confirm that one can only manipulate a price down for so long. With recent disclosures by Wikileaks that China had been imposing pressure on the Treasury and the US banking system to get what it wants, is it too surprising to assume that just as JPM has long been manipulating the price of silver, so Chinese interests in the US (remember – quid pro quo in a M.A.D. world) have been instructed to keep the price of Rough Rice as low for as long as possible. If that is the case, are the Rice vigilantes about to call the Chinese bluff? If rice succeeds in breaking out from its $ 13-$ 16 trading range, the move to the upside could make the recent doubling in cotton, and surges in corn and wheat seem like child’s play.

In an interview with The Daily Telegraph, Mervyn King said that “imbalances” in the banking system remain and are “beginning to grow again”.

But leading economists, including a former Tory advisor and the chief executive of the British Bankers’ Association, have criticised his comments.

Tim Congdon, who served on the Treasury Panel of Independent Forecasters (the so-called “wise men”) under the last Conservative government, called the remarks “unjustified”.

He said: “The truth is the financial sector is very important to the British economy. He’s been at the Bank of England for twenty years… I find it incredible that he’s now attacking the structure of the industry.

“If you criticise the banks you reduce their credibility and then people worry about them. The important thing for the Governor of the Bank of England is to help them.”

Angela Knight, chief executive, British Bankers’ Association, said: “We view the Governor with the highest respect, but in this instance there are a number of points with which we disagree.

“The banking industry recognises that some of its number got it badly wrong during the crisis. Since then the industry has reformed radically.

“We work closely with our customers of all sizes and types and in doing so have created one of the largest financial centres in the world and a great contributor to the British economy. We achieved this together by doing our business well – not by doing it badly.

“We entirely agree that no bank should believe it can fall back on the taxpayer. The changes from top to bottom within the industry have ensured the risks are well controlled, and all banks have put recovery and resolution plans in place to answer the too-big-to-fail question and so safeguard customers and the taxpayer against the remote consequences of any future failure.”

In the interview Mr King urges high street banks to take a better, longer term view towards their customers and to stop focusing on the need to “simply maximise profits next week”.

He accuses them of routinely exploiting their millions of customers. “If it’s possible [for financial services firms] to make money out of gullible or unsuspecting customers, particularly institutional customers, [they think] that is perfectly acceptable,” he says.

The Governor criticises the “weight put on the importance and value of takeovers” and raises concerns that companies with good reputations have been “destroyed” in the search for short-term profits.

Mr King expresses regret for not sounding a louder warning over his concerns before the last banking crisis.

The Governor’s remarks are a warning to George Osborne, the Chancellor, as a government commission considers whether to force high street banks to sell off their investment banking arms.

Mr Osborne is thought to be against such a plan, but Mr King is due to ultimately become responsible for banking regulation and his views are, therefore, critical.

In the interview, the Bank Governor says: “We allowed a [banking] system to build up which contained the seeds of its own destruction.

“We’ve not yet solved the ‘too big to fail’ or, as I prefer to call it, the ‘too important to fail’ problem.

“The concept of being too important to fail should have no place in a market economy.”

When asked whether there could be a repeat of the financial crisis, Mr King says: “Yes. The problem is still there. The search for yield goes on. Imbalances are beginning to grow again.”

Mr King, who rarely gives interviews, suggests that the culture of short-term profits and bonuses within the banks may ultimately be responsible for the problems.

He says that traditional manufacturing industries have a more “moral” way of operating.

“They care deeply about their workforce, about their customers and, above all, are proud of their products,” he says. “[With the banks] there isn’t that sense of longer term relationships.

“There’s a different attitude towards customers. Small and medium firms really notice this: they miss the people they know.”

The Governor adds that good businesses “keep a clear vision of who their customers are, and are run by people who don’t think they should simply maximise profits next week.” He says that the payment of bonuses is part of this cultural problem. “Why do banks in general want to pay bonuses?” Mr King asks. “It’s because they live in a ‘too big to fail’ world in which the state will bail them out on the downside.”

Over the past 30 years, he says, “we changed Britain away from a sclerotic economy with inefficiencies and problems in labour relations. Everyone got to the point where we no longer expected government to bail us out.”

He says this changed with the banking crisis. ‘But, surprise, surprise, the institutions bailed out were those at the heart of the crisis. Hedge funds were allowed to fail, 3,000 of them have gone, but banks weren’t,’ he says.

The comments will embarrass the Chancellor, who recently concluded a deal with the banks under which they would be able to resume the payment of bonuses in return for boosting lending.

Mr King does not back down from recent comments that appeared to back the Government’s strategy for reducing the deficit. Ed Balls, the shadow chancellor, recently accused the Governor of becoming too political.

Mr King said: “It is inconceivable that the Governor has no view on the size of the deficit and the need to reduce it. It would be a dereliction of duty for me not to warn. You need a credible plan to reduce it, over the lifetime of a Parliament. But it is for ministers, not for me, to say how this should be done.”

In the interview, the Governor gives little clue as to whether an interest rate rise is imminent.

Mr King says there is a “perfectly reasonable case for doing it now” but he added that increasing rates too soon would be a “futile gesture”.